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Chapter 13
Risk Management Through
International Diversification: The Case
of Latin American Pension Funds
P. S. Srinivas and Juan Yermo
There are some investors who have a rooted prejudice against all foreign
investment. This attitude is highly patriotic, no doubt, but like every
other fancy, it has to be paid for. (The Investment Registry, London, ∞Ω≠∂)
Much of this volume focuses on retirement issues in developed nations,
particularly the United States. In contrast, the present chapter offers a dif-
ferent international dimension by focusing on retirement issues in Latin
American old-age systems. This topic is of keen interest because many Latin
American countries have instituted privatized mandatory funded defined
contribution systems in the last two decades, and in the process they are
seeking better ways to manage investment risk. Finance theory argues for
international diversification of pension assets as a useful risk management
tool, an argument particularly relevant in the context of emerging markets
with a limited set of domestic investment opportunities. Nevertheless, with
the exception of Chile, few pension funds in Latin America invest in foreign
assets. Our goal in this chapter is to offer empricial evidence of the potential
for improvement in risk-adjusted returns for Latin American pension funds,
achievable through international investment. We show that restricting inter-
national investments imposes costs on pension stakeholders in terms of lost
returns and higher levels of risk per unit of realized return.
Our discussion begins with a brief overview of the international pension
reform context. Next we describe the main arguments for and against inter-
national diversification, followed by an overview of the private pension sys-
tems in Latin America and the regulatory environment under which they
operate. Subsequent to a description of the data and methodology used for
the analysis, we evaluate the gains from international diversification from
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the perspectives of investors in both developed and developing countries.
Last we focus on pension fund performance under alternate investment
strategies. We employ a standard mean-variance framework, market data
from ∞Ωπ∏–ΩΩ, and risk adjusted returns as the measure of benefits. These
indicate that pension funds in three Latin American countries with the long-
est history of private pension funds—Argentina, Chile, and Peru—would
have benefited from diversifying into international markets. We conclude
that, in these countries, pension funds could have achieved higher risk
adjusted returns than they actually did by investing in international assets.
Relaxing international investment restrictions would provide avenues for
better risk management. In countries that do allow such investments, pen-
sion funds should look more actively into international diversification.
The International Pension Reform Context
It is well known that old-age systems in virtually every country are under
stress, as they face the dual pressures of rapidly aging populations living
longer in retirement, and declining birth rates reducing the pool of active
workers. In a majority of countries, public pensions (or the income compo-
nent of social security systems) were traditionally based on a mandatory
defined benefit (DB) model where current workers pay social security taxes
that finance current retirees’ pension payments (pay-as-you-go; PAYG). Few
public pension systems built up reserves of assets, and today most are under-
funded to one degree or another.
As a natural consequence of population aging, the PAYGO DB model
today confronts policymakers in many countries with highly unpalatable
choices: raising tax rates, cutting benefits, or offering an entirely new frame-
work for retirement income provision. Various countries have adopted dif-
ferent strategies to avert their old age crises, ranging from denial, to mar-
ginal changes, to large-scale revamping. Many Latin American and Eastern
European nations, especially those where the old schemes were most under
stress, have tended to adopt the third approach. This entails transforming
their social security systems, generally moving from the traditional DB
model to a privately managed, individual account based, defined contribu-
tion (DC) model.∞
Latin America has been the leader in reforming old, dysfunctional social
security systems, and the wide range of new DC models adopted in the
region serve to spur debate in many developed economies, including those
considering ‘‘privatizing’’ as in the United States.≤ The Latin American pen-
sion reforms have not been without their critics: for instance, Diamond
(∞ΩΩ∫) eloquently argues that DB systems are the first-best design for social
security systems, in light of their ability to transfer risk intergenerationally.
He and others contend that a DC system is often a response to the poor
implementation records of DB systems, so that their limitations should be
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recognized. In a separate paper, Orszag and Stiglitz (∞ΩΩΩ) highlight several
problems with the Latin American reform models, and more recently Holz-
mann (≤≠≠≠a) shows that public DB systems can provide significant risk
management benefits when there is low correlation between wage growth
and financial asset returns. In this chapter we take the new pension models
as a given and address certain aspects of a key implementation issue, namely
how to manage assets in these reformed systems.
With the change in design of the pension system from a PAYG (un-
funded) to a funded one, Latin American pension funds have begun ac-
cumulating substantial amounts of assets. At the end of ∞ΩΩΩ, mandatory
private pension systems in Latin America had about $π≠ billion in assets
under management (∫ percent of combined GDP). Brazil, which has a
voluntary and largely employer-based pension system, had over $∫≠ billion
in assets (∞≠ percent of GDP). Salomon Smith Barney, the investment bank,
projects that Latin pension fund assets will grow to about $∫∑≠ billion by
≤≠∞∑. Despite these optimistic forecasts, Latin American private pension
funds face many challenges operating within the context of relatively less
developed financial markets and weaker institutional structures (compared
to those in the developed economies). Specifically, as assets under manage-
ment have grown and prior experience with asset management is limited,
one major area of concern has been how these funds should be invested and
how risks in the process should be managed. In particular, we focus on the
debate that has accompanied the issue of Latin pension funds investing (at
least a part of) their assets abroad, in the developed markets.
Given that emerging markets have traditionally been looked on as invest-
ment opportunities for investors in developed countries, rather than as
investors in their own right, there is little empirical work that has taken the
perspective of the emerging market investor looking outwards. In theory,
the issues are identical, irrespective of the domicile of the investor. In prac-
tice, as we show below, emerging market investors considering diversifying
into developed markets for risk management or return enhancement see
the world somewhat differently. Developed country financial markets often
offer better return per unit of risk characteristics, lower transactions costs,
more favorable return distributions, and beneficial correlation characteris-
tics. For this reason, constraining emerging market pension portfolios by
restricting investments to less developed financial markets will therefore be
likely to expose pension plan stakeholders to higher risks. Better risk man-
agement would argue for greater international diversification.
Invest at Home or Abroad: The International
Diversification Debate
In a fully integrated and efficient financial market, modern finance theory
has established that the world market portfolio is the optimal risky asset to
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hold.≥ Hence, at first glance, a debate over the appropriateness of interna-
tional asset diversification might seem strange. Theory would argue that an
investor exposed only to domestic investments should perceive that interna-
tional diversification reduces risk per unit of return, achieved by investing in
asset classes that are not perfectly correlated with his existing portfolio.
In line with this theory, initial empirical research indicated that there was
a low correlation between U.S. and other developed market assets, as well as
between U.S. and emerging market assets.∂ This research impelled U.S.
pension funds to diversify into other developed country markets and, later,
into emerging markets. More recently, however, new research is casting
doubt on the value of international diversification, at least for U.S. investors.
In bond markets, U.S. investors apparently face highly integrated interna-
tional fixed-income securities markets; this integration reduces the benefits
from U.S. diversification into foreign bonds. In equity markets, capital mar-
ket integration has also led to an increase in the correlation between U.S.
and other developed equity markets (Adrangi and Shank ∞ΩΩ∫). Further-
more, over the last three-quarters of a century, the U.S. equity market had
the highest mean return of all equity markets in the world, and this return
appears to be substantially higher than that of most other countries even
after adjusting for volatility (Goetzmann and Jorion ∞ΩΩΩ). Other research-
ers have shown that U.S. investors can achieve the benefits of international
diversification by investing in portfolios of domestic securities, so that gains
beyond those attainable through homemade diversification have become
statistically and economically insignificant (Errunza, Hogen, and Hung
∞ΩΩΩ). Correlation and covariance patterns between equity returns of the
major industrialized countries are also unstable over time, and it appears
that correlations tend to rise in periods of high volatility, thereby reducing
the benefits of diversification (Longin and Solnik ∞ΩΩ∑). Focusing on U.S.
investors diversifying into emerging markets, Blommenstein (∞ΩΩ∫) argues
that the dollar returns in emerging markets over the past ≤≠ years have not
been significantly higher than those on the U.S. stock markets, but they
have been much more volatile. As a result, gains are low to U.S. investors in
terms of risk-adjusted returns from emerging market investments.
Turning to emerging markets, Bekaert et al. (∞ΩΩ∫) find that returns in sev-
eral emerging markets exhibit skewness and kurtosis characteristics that
deviate substantially from those that would be observed if the underlying
return distribution were normal, and hence conclude that benefits of inter-
national diversification presented through mean-variance analyses may be
biased. That analysis also provides evidence that the higher moments of
emerging market return distributions change through time, making the ex
ante investment decision and its ex post evaluation more difficult. Finally,
some observers propose that, as with changing patterns of correlations be-
tween industrialized countries, developed and emerging market correla-
tions also change over time, thereby reducing the appeal of investing in
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emerging markets. Correlations appear highest during downturns in devel-
oped markets, but this is just when investors most need low correlations. This
arises because emerging market economies often follow in the wake of devel-
oped markets, especially that of the U.S. Indeed, U.S.-emerging market cor-
relations are much more unstable than correlations between the U.S. and
other developed markets. Financial models based on historical market data
may also not fully take into account the event volatility associated with macro-
economic and political uncertainty, and the less transparent regulatory and
legislative frameworks of developing countries.∑ Partly in reaction to a grow-
ing number of such findings, there is a suggestion that U.S. pension funds
have recently begun rethinking their international investment strategies.∏
For other OECD countries, however, portfolio diversification into emerg-
ing country assets still appears to provide significant gains (Fischer and
Reisen, ∞ΩΩ∂). Moreover, some observers have found evidence that interna-
tional diversification can be most beneficial when one takes into account
the whole portfolio of retirement assets, including nontraded assets such as
human capital and assets in public defined benefit pension plans. In par-
ticular, Baxter and King (≤≠≠≠) demonstrate important risk management
benefits from holding international assets, even when the gains of interna-
tional diversification by themselves are low, because human capital returns
are more highly correlated with domestic financial returns than with inter-
national financial returns. Hence the optimal allocation to international
securities may well be higher when one considers the full set of traded and
nontraded assets, than when one only considers traded financial assets.
From an emerging market perspective, objections to international port-
folio investment tend to be grounded less in financial risk management
theory than in macroeconomic and political economy considerations. At
least in part, these arguments rely on the multiple objectives offered for
social security privatization. That is, old-age pension reform in emerging
economies is undertaken for many reasons, and optimization of contributor
risk and return is only one (and often not the most important) of several
competing objectives. In developing economies it is often argued that pen-
sion funds should be restricted from investing abroad to ensure the develop-
ment of domestic capital markets, and to make sure that domestic capital
resources are channeled toward domestic investments.π Also, research has
argued that domestic market liquidity is a major link between financial
development and growth (Levine and Zervos, ∞ΩΩ∫). This stance is con-
tested by Reisen and Williamson (∞ΩΩπ), among others, who show that there
is little evidence that domestic market liquidity improves as a result of invest-
ment restrictions on foreign securities.
Another rationale for restricting pension investments to domestic mar-
kets is that many governments need to finance debt, particularly the so-
called ‘‘transition debt’’ associated with social security reform (Corsetti and
Schmidt-Hebbel ∞ΩΩ∑). In this context, private pension funds are often
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required to invest in government securities so as to avoid driving up interest
rates that might worsen government finances and crowd out private invest-
ment. Of course this argument does not imply that private pension funds
should be required to invest all of their assets in government bonds, and
hence this argument is silent on the allocation of assets beyond that portion
that is required to be invested in government bonds.
Other reasons offered to justify limiting international investments by pen-
sion funds include the existence and necessity of capital controls in emerg-
ing markets and the importance of maintaining exchange rate stability
(Fontaine ∞ΩΩπ). Capital controls are often imposed in emerging markets to
prevent capital flight and thereby to protect the domestic tax base. Often
countries have justified controls on capital inflows with arguments that such
flows may destabilize or accentuate the instability of financial systems. Chile
had controls on capital inflows for almost two decades before relaxing them
subsequent to the ∞ΩΩπ/Ω∫ crises in East Asia and Brazil. More recently,
Malaysia imposed such controls during the ∞ΩΩπ/Ω∫ East Asian crisis, al-
though these are gradually being relaxed. It is also argued that volatile
capital flows may put pressure on exchange rate stability, increasing fluctua-
tions in both nominal and real exchange rates and consequently domestic
price levels and export competitiveness. Since emerging markets are be-
lieved to be less able to withstand the impact of such shocks, preventing
domestic institutional investors such as pension funds from adding to these
pressures has been a priority. In turn this has implied imposing strict limits
on their international investments.
Against this backdrop—mixed evidence on benefits of international di-
versification for U.S. investors and objections to international diversifica-
tion by emerging market investors—are there good financial reasons why
Latin American private pension funds should invest abroad? Is there any
evidence that diversification from an emerging market portfolio into one
including developed market assets is advantageous? Would investment risks
facing pensions be better managed if the pension funds were allowed to
invest more abroad? We address these issues next.
Privatized Latin American Pension Systems
As noted above, eight Latin American countries have implemented funda-
mental reforms of their social security systems to date, moving from publicly
managed DB systems to privately managed DC plans; additional countries
are currently moving in the same direction. These new pension funds are ac-
cumulating assets at a rapid rate and are expected to continue their growth
in the medium term (see Table ∞). Unlike mature systems in developed
countries, where most of the asset growth occurs due to investment returns,
the major source of asset growth in these much younger pension systems of
the Latin countries is, and will continue to be, fresh contributions.
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Table 1. Assets Managed by Private Pension Funds in Latin America
Assets Under Management
(US$ million)
∞ΩΩ∫ ∞ΩΩΩ
Assets Under
Management/GDP (%)
∞ΩΩ∫ ∞ΩΩΩ
Argentina ∞∞,∑≤∏ ∞∏,π∫π ≥.Ω ∑.Ω
Bolivia ≥≥≥ ∑Ω≤ ∂.≠ π.≠
Chile ≥∞,∞∂∏ ≥∂,∑≠∞ ∂≥.Ω ∑≥.≥
Colombia ≤,∞∞Ω ≤,∫∫π ≤.∂ π.≥
El Salvador ∂π ≤∞≥ ≠.∂ ∞.π
Mexico ∑,π≥≠ ∞∞,∂≥≠ ∞.∂ ≤.≥
Peru ∞,π∞≥ ≤,∂≠∏ ≤.π ∂.∞
Uruguay ≥π∂ ∑Ω∞ ∞.Ω ≤.∫
Total/Average ∑≤,Ω∫∫ ∏Ω,∂≠π π.∏ ∞≠.∏
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from various pension fund, national bank, and invest-
ment house sources.
Note: Local currency equivalents are converted to US$ using year-end exchange rates. The
overall average assets-to-GDP ratio is the arithmetic mean of the individual country figures.
While future asset growth in these systems is clearly on an upward trend,
there is more uncertainty regarding the performance of this new pension
fund industry. Past performance by Latin pension funds, averaged across
all pension funds in a country, has been claimed to be good by many policy-
makers and practitioners because of high (relative to developed countries)
real returns (see Table ≤). But relative to market benchmarks, arguably
a more relevant comparison, the performance of Latin private pension
funds has been mixed, with relative pension fund performance being af-
fected by choice of both benchmarks and time periods (Srinivas and Yermo,
∞ΩΩΩ).
In the three countries with the longest running private pension systems—
Argentina, Chile, and Peru—private pension fund returns gross of manage-
ment fees have been both lower and more volatile in recent years (see
Figure ∞ and Table ≥). Chilean pension funds’ nominal gross returns were
about ≤∂.∑ percent (about ∞∞.≤ percent in real terms) during January ∞Ω∫≤–
December ∞ΩΩΩ. Further, dividing this sample period into two equal parts
( January ∞Ω∫≤–December ∞ΩΩ≠ and January ∞ΩΩ∞–December ∞ΩΩΩ) reveals
that average annual returns were higher in the first period (≥∞.≥ percent)
and lower in the second, more recent, period (∞π.∏ percent). Recent re-
turns were also more volatile, with a standard deviation of π.≥≥ percent as
compared to the volatility in the earlier period of ∂.Ω∑ percent. The null
hypothesis of equality of mean returns can be rejected at the ∞ percent
confidence level. Similar results hold for Argentina and Peru, although the
time frame during which these private systems have operated here is shorter
than in Chile.
This pattern of pension fund performance can be explained, at least in
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Table 2. Latin American Pension Fund Returns from Inception to Year-End
∞ΩΩΩ (%)
Country
Year of
Inception
Nominal Return
Since Inception
Real Return
Since Inception
Argentina ∞ΩΩ∂ ∞≤.Ωπ ∞≤.∂∏
Bolivia ∞ΩΩπ ∞∑.∞∞ Ω.≤∂
Colombia ∞ΩΩ∂ ≤∫.≥∂ Ω.≠∫
Chile ∞Ω∫∞ ≤π.∂≠ ∞∞.≤≠
El Salvador ∞ΩΩ∫ ∞≤.Ω∂ ∞∂.≠Ω
Mexico ∞ΩΩπ ≥≠.≤∂ Ω.∏∑
Peru ∞ΩΩ≥ ∞∏.∫≠ π.≤∫
Uruguay ∞ΩΩ∏ ≤∞.∑∂ π.Ω∂
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from various pension fund, national bank, and invest-
ment house sources.
Note: Colombian pension fund returns measured since ∞ΩΩ∏ only; El Salvador returns corre-
spond to calendar year ∞ΩΩΩ. All historical returns correspond to the geometric mean over
the sample period. Average industry nominal returns calculated by weighting each pension
fund return by its assets under management at the end of the period. Real returns are ob-
tained by deflating nominal returns by the national consumer price index or by related price
indices (e.g., the ‘‘unidad de fomento’’ in Chile, the ‘‘unidad reajustable’’ in Uruguay). Re-
turns are gross of fees, i.e., administrative costs of managing pension assets are not deducted
from returns.
part, by the fact that in the early stages of the introduction of these new
systems governments sought to ensure that these funds showed positive
returns, in order to establish system credibility. Toward this end, pension
fund regulations were tight and investments were largely in government
bonds that paid extremely high interest rates with low price volatility. Over
time, as pension systems became more established, investment regimes were
gradually liberalized, allowing pension funds to invest in a broader range of
assets. This exposed them to more sources of volatility. Concurrently, as
these economies became more stable, interest rates on government bonds
fell, which in turn affected pension fund returns as a result of their large
allocation to these bonds (see Table ∂). Most recently, many Latin American
domestic financial markets have been quite volatile due to the East Asian
and Brazilian crises; these too have been a proximate cause of the decline in
pension asset performance. These trends in performance provide a good
motivation for these pension funds to examine alternate avenues—such as
international diversification—to enhance performance.∫ Indeed, in Chile,
pension funds have increased their exposure to foreign securities (mainly
U.S.) in recent years (see Table ∑). By December ∞ΩΩΩ, Chilean pension
funds held ∞≥.∂ percent of their aggregate portfolio in foreign assets, up
from zero at the system’s inception.Ω
These new Latin American DC pension systems expose pension assets to a
number of risks, so governments in these countries have often strictly regu-
lated the pension fund management industry’s structure, performance,
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Figure ∞. Realized annual pension fund return in Chile, Argentina, and Peru, percent
per year from inception to year-end ∞ΩΩΩ. Source: Authors’ calculations using data
provided by Asociación Internacional de Organismos de Supervisión de Fondos e
Pensiones (AIOS, the International Association of Pension Supervisors). Average
industry nominal annual returns calculated by weighting each pension fund’s annual
return by its assets under management at the end of the year. Real returns are gross of
fees; administrative costs of managing pension assets are not deducted from returns.
and asset allocation practices. Typically, industry structure is regulated
through the establishment of fund management industries consisting of
competing pension funds distinct from other financial institutions and new
entrants into the financial system. This financial structure has been offered
as the solution to the often poor record of performance and management
in the preexisting financial services sector. Reflecting the fact that pension
systems in Latin America are mandatory, countries have imposed strict per-
formance criteria on the pension funds. The general structure of these
requirements is that all pension funds are required to provide returns
within a band around the ex post industry-average return. Penalties apply
for underperformance, while ‘‘excess’’ returns are sequestered as a reserve
against potential future underperformance. Finally, in a majority of coun-
tries, there are also restrictions on the type of investments that can be made
and limits on allocations to asset classes.
Pension fund investment regulations in most countries have a prudential
objective, namely, to ensure that they do not take excessive risks by overex-
posing their portfolios to specific securities and issuers. Latin American
countries have established prudential regulations similar to those in devel-
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Table 3. Latin American Pension Fund Mean Annual Returns and Standard Deviation
Argentina Chile Peru
Time period of complete sample Aug. ’Ω∂–Dec. ’ΩΩ Jan. ’∫≤–Dec. ’ΩΩ Aug. ’Ω≥–Dec. ’ΩΩ
Mean annual return ∞≤.∏Ω ≤∂.∂Ω ∞∏.Ω≠
Standard deviation of returns ∫.∑∂ ∏.∑∑ ∑.∂Ω
Time period of first sub-sample Aug. ’Ω∂–Mar. ’Ωπ Jan. ’∫≤–Dec. ’Ω≠ Aug. ’Ω≥–Oct. ’Ω∏
(M∞) Mean annual return ∞π.≥π ≥∞.≥π ≤∞.∂∏
Standard deviation of returns ∂.∫∞ ∂.Ω∑ ∂.≠≤
Time period of second sub-sample Apr. ’Ωπ–Dec. ’ΩΩ Jan. ’Ω∞–Dec. ’ΩΩ Nov. ’Ω∏–Dec. ’ΩΩ
(M≤) Mean annual return ∫.∞∑ ∞π.∏≤ ∞≤.≤∞
Standard deviation of returns ∞≠.Ω∂ π.≥≥ ∏.∂∑
t-statistic for null ∞.≤∫ ∂.∏∏ ≤.∞π
hypothesis of M∞=M≤ not significant significant at ∞% significant at ∑%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by Asociación Internacional de Organismos de Su-
pervisión de Fondos de Pensiones (AIOS, the International Association of Pension Fund Supervisors).
Note: Data for Chile begin in January ∞Ω∫≤, which was the first full year of operation. Panel A presents the
performance of the pension funds since inception up to December ∞ΩΩΩ. For each country, the time
since inception of the private pension funds up to year-end ∞ΩΩΩ is divided into two equal halves to assess
change in performance over time. Panel B presents the mean and standard deviation of pension fund
returns in the initial period since inception and Panel C, the same data for the more recent period.
Panel D presents the results of a t-test for equality of means of the two time periods, assuming different
variances. The null hypothesis of equality of means can be rejected for Chile and Peru, but not for
Argentina.
oped countries. These regulations cover single issuer and single security
exposure limits and also require that fixed income investments be of a
minimum risk rating. For example, in Chile, prudential regulation requires
pension funds to limit their investments in a single issue of fixed income
securities to seven percent of their portfolio and their investment in the
equity of a single issuer to five percent of their portfolio. To avoid conflicts
of interest, the limits are set lower for issuers that have financial interests in
the pension fund management companies. The minimum acceptable risk
category for fixed income securities is BBB or equivalent. There are similar
prudential rules in other countries.
In addition to these prudential rules, all Latin American countries im-
pose quantitative restrictions on portfolio allocation by asset type (see Table
∏). In Argentina, for example, pension funds are not allowed to invest more
than ∑≠ percent of their assets in government securities, while Mexico does
not permit any investment in equities. This contrasts with the situation in
some developed countries such as Austria, Australia, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States which
largely rely on ‘‘prudent-person’’ regulations.
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Table 5. Foreign Investment by Latin American Pension Funds
Year
Chile
Amount
(US$M)
Percent of
Portfolio
Argentina
Amount
(US$M)
Percent of
Portfolio
∞ΩΩ∞ ≠ ≠ — —
∞ΩΩ≤ ≠ ≠.≠ — —
∞ΩΩ≥ Ω∑.π ≠.∏ — —
∞ΩΩ∂ ≤≠≠.π ≠.Ω ≠.∂ ≠.∞
∞ΩΩ∑ ∑≠.≥ ≠.≤ ∞∫.≤ ≠.π
∞ΩΩ∏ ∞∂∏.Ω ≠.∑ ∫.∑ ≠.≤
∞ΩΩπ ≥∏∫.π ∞.∞ ≥≤.Ω ≠.∂
∞ΩΩ∫ ∞,π∑≥.∏ ∑.∏ ≤∫.Ω ≠.≥
∞ΩΩΩ ∂,∏≤≥.∞ ∞≥.∂ ∏π.≤ ≠.∂
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from pension fund regulators.
Focusing on regulations governing foreign investments, only three Latin
countries—Argentina, Chile, and Peru—permitted investment abroad by
pension funds at the end of ∞ΩΩΩ, and even here at levels much lower than
either those prevalent in developed countries or levels that would follow
from the relative weight of these countries in a global portfolio.∞≠ In Chile,
foreign investment was first allowed in ∞ΩΩ≤, at three percent of the port-
folio. This limit was subsequently raised to nine percent in ∞ΩΩ∑, ∞≤ percent
in ∞ΩΩπ, and ≤≠ percent in ∞ΩΩΩ. Each time, the full allowance could be
invested in foreign fixed income securities, but only half could be invested
in foreign equities. Meanwhile, Argentina has restricted this level to ∞≠
percent since the system’s inception. Again, while the full allowance could
be invested in foreign bonds, only a maximum of seven percent could be
invested in foreign equity. In Peru, pension funds have recently been al-
lowed to invest up to one percent of their portfolio abroad. In terms of ac-
tual investments, only Argentine and Chilean pension funds have invested
in foreign assets (see Table ∑). While Chilean pension funds began investing
in foreign assets in ∞ΩΩ≥, their role in the overall portfolio was minimal until
∞ΩΩ∫ and became more substantial in ∞ΩΩΩ, with over ∞≥ percent of assets
being invested abroad. One reason for this large recent increase in Chilean
pension funds’ interest in international assets is the poor performance of
domestic markets during the East Asian and Brazilian crises. Argentine
pension funds still invest a very small fraction of assets overseas.
Other countries contemplate investment abroad in their pension legisla-
tion but, as was true in Peru until recently, the relevant central bank or other
regulatory authority did not permit such investments. This is true in Colom-
bia and Bolivia, where for instance in Colombia, the limit is set at ∞≠ percent,
while in Bolivia the law permits investment of between ∞≠ and ≥≠ percent of
the portfolio in foreign securities. In fact, in neither of these countries have
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Table 6. Maximum Portfolio Limits for Selected Latin American Pension Funds (Year-End
∞ΩΩΩ)
Argentina Chile Peru Colombia Mexico Uruguay El Salvador
Government
Securities
∑≠ ∑≠ ∂≠ ∑≠ ∞≠≠ Min ∑≠ ∞≠≠
Corporate Bonds ∂≠ ∂∑ ∂≠ ≤≠ ≥∑ ≤∑ ≥≠
Financial Institu-
tions/Deposits
≤∫ ∑≠ ∂≠ ∑≠ ∞≠ ≥≠ ∂≠
Equities ≥∑ ≥π ≥∑ ≥≠ ≠ ≤∑ ∑
Investment Mutual
Funds
∞∂ ∞≠ ∞∑ ∑ ≠ ≠ ≠
Foreign Securities ∞≠ ≤≠ ∞ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠
Hedging
Instruments
≤ Ω ∑ ∑ ≠ ≠ ≠
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by pension fund regulators.
Note: Columns do not need to sum to ∞≠≠ percent as not all limits are simultaneously binding. Limits
imposed by regulators and may differ from limits set by law. Government securities include all sovereign
obligations including central bank and treasury paper. Corporate bonds are obligations of the non-
financial private sector and includes certificates of deposit issued by such entities. Financial institutions
includes bonds and certificates of deposit issued by financial institutions, cash deposits of pension funds
with the banking sector, and mortgage securities. Equities are self-explanatory. Investment funds include
investments by pension funds in mutual funds and other pooled investment vehicles that, in turn,
manage those assets. Foreign securities include all foreign assets denominated in foreign currency.
Investments in assets denominated in foreign currency but issued by domestic issuers are included in
their respective categories and are not considered foreign assets. Hedging instruments are derivatives
such as futures and forward contracts.
foreign assets actually been permitted in the pension funds. The other Latin
countries with mandatory pension fund systems, Mexico, Uruguay, and El
Salvador, do not contemplate foreign investment in their pension legisla-
tion.
While foreign investment has been controversial in some developed
countries, for some of the same reasons as those currently being advanced
in emerging markets, these limits have been liberalized over time. For exam-
ple, in OECD countries that do have statutory limits on foreign investments,
the ceiling is usually above ≤≠ percent (see Table π).
Modeling the Gains from Diversification
To explore further the potential gains from international portfolio diversifi-
cation by Latin American pension funds, we first study the issue of diversifi-
cation from domestic to international markets in general. Next we examine
pension funds in the three countries that have the longest histories of oper-
ating national mandatory private pension funds in the region, namely Ar-
gentina, Chile, and Peru. We use stock market indices as a measure of
overall stock market performance and construct different portfolios and
Table 7. Limits on International Investments by Pension Funds in OECD
Countries
Prudent person
Austria, Australia,
Ireland, the
Netherlands,
New Zealand,
UK, U.S. (no limits)
Iceland no foreign investments by public-sector funds
Japan no limits for Employees Pension Funds
Spain no limits in other OECD countries
Asset limits
Belgium no investments in non-EU countries
Canada ≥≠% limit
Czech Republic no investments outside OECD countries
Denmark ≤≠% limit.
Finland ≤≠% in other EU states; maximum ∑% in non-EU countries;
there is also a minimum currency-matching requirement
of ∫≠%.
France no foreign assets (insured funds)
Germany maximum ≤≠% in foreign assets overall; maximum ∏% in non-
EU equities, ∏% in non-EU bonds; there is also a minimum
currency-matching requirement of ∫≠%.
Greece maximum ≤≠% in domestically based mutual funds, which in
turn can invest abroad
Hungary mandatory pension funds: ≠% in ∞ΩΩΩ, increasing to ≥≠% by
Jan ∞, ≤≠≠≤; voluntary pension funds: ≤≠%; the ratio of
investment in non-OECD countries shall not exceed ≥≠% of all
foreign investment.
Italy ∑≠% limit on debt and equity securities of OECD countries
traded in regulated markets; ∑% limit on debt and equity
securities of non-OECD countries traded in regulated
markets; debt and equity securities of non-OECD countries
traded in non-regulated market are prohibited.
Korea ∞≠% limit
Luxembourg ∞≠% in non-OECD countries
Mexico no foreign investment
Norway no limits
Portugal ≤≠% limit
Poland ∑% limit on foreign assets
Sweden ∑–∞≠% limit, depending on type of fund and assets concerned
Switzerland ≥≠% global limit: ≥≠% in foreign bonds, ≤∑% in foreign
equities, ∑% in property
Source: Srinivas, Whitehouse, and Yermo (∞ΩΩΩ), Laboul (∞ΩΩ∫), OECD (∞ΩΩ∫).
Note: Investment by pension funds is not regulated in Turkey. Restrictions placed on interna-
tional investments by pension funds in countries that are members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The prevalent regulatory regimes in the
countries are divided into two types. First, ‘‘Prudent person’’ regulation is similar to that in
the United States, where there are few explicit limits on asset allocation. The second type of
regulatory regime is one in which countries impose explicit asset allocation limits, usually in
percentage terms, on pension fund investments.
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assess their performance in a mean-variance framework. For individual
countries, we use country indices from the Emerging Markets Database
(≤≠≠≠ version) of the Standard & Poor’s Corporation (S&P). These indices
provide a good measure of the investment opportunities available to domes-
tic investors in equity markets. For developed countries we use two mea-
sures: the Standard & Poor’s ∑≠≠ (S&P ∑≠≠) index as a measure of U.S.
equity market returns, and the Morgan Stanley Capital International Eu-
rope, Australia, and Far East (MSCI EAFE) index as a measure of developed-
market equity returns (excluding the U.S.).∞∞ We also use the International
Finance Corporation Latin America Investible (IFCI) returns index as a
measure of investment opportunities available to U.S. investors when con-
sidering investments in the region. All data are given in terms of monthly
total returns, except for the MSCI EAFE where only monthly price returns
are available for the relevant time frame. We use data for each country
since the inception of the respective series. For Argentina, the IFC index of
monthly equity market returns is available from January ∞ΩπΩ; for Brazil,
Chile, and Mexico the corresponding starting date is January ∞Ωπ∏ and for
Peru it is January ∞ΩΩ≥. All data series end in December ∞ΩΩΩ. Correspond-
ing to these dates, we use monthly data for the S&P ∑≠≠ and the MSCI EAFE
indices to construct portfolios.
Pension fund returns in Argentina, Chile, and Peru are obtained from
annual reports of the pension funds and regulators in various countries,
from their websites, and through personal communications. Monthly total
return data are used for all countries, gross of pension fund administrative
expenses.∞≤ Argentine pension fund return data are available from August
∞ΩΩ∂, Chilean data from January ∞Ω∫≤, and Peruvian data from August ∞ΩΩ≥.
Corresponding to these dates, we use monthly data for the S&P ∑≠≠ and the
MSCI EAFE indices to construct portfolios. All returns and standard devia-
tions are calculated in the local currency of each country, since this is the
relevant measure for a domestic investor. Throughout the analysis, we as-
sume that investors are only interested in returns in their respective curren-
cies and do not use instruments to hedge currency risk. Therefore, we
abstract from currency hedging issues.∞≥ Since both the S&P ∑≠≠ and MSCI
EAFE returns are available in U.S. dollars, we convert these returns to local
currency for each country using month-end exchange rates. From monthly
returns, we obtain annual arithmetic returns by averaging across monthly
returns and multiplying by twelve.
Emerging market financial data pose unique problems, and it is useful to
keep these in mind while interpreting our results. While we have tried to use
data for each country ever since these became available, some series are still
too short to provide complete comfort in making inferences. The use of
monthly data only partly mitigates this problem. Emerging stock markets
are also very volatile and face frequent structural shocks, often as a result of
shocks to the macroeconomy. While short data samples are unlikely to cap-
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ture longer term trends, longer samples can put too much weight on old
trends that may have been radically altered by structural shocks.
International Equity Investment: The Perspective of a
U.S. Investor
To lay out our methodological approach, it is useful to first examine the
case of a U.S. investor examining alternative diversification avenues for his
equity portfolio. This analysis sheds light on the ongoing debate over the
benefits of international diversification by U.S. investors that can then be
compared with emerging market investors. To this end we construct alter-
nate portfolios for a U.S. investor and examine the effect of diversification
into emerging markets and other developed markets. The measure of bene-
fits of diversification that we use is return per unit of risk or the Sharpe ratio.
This measure is constructed as the arithmetic average of monthly returns
divided by the standard deviation of monthly returns over the time period of
interest. We examine portfolios that have incremental amounts of interna-
tional assets: for example, we start with a U.S. investor investing his assets
fully in the S&P ∑≠≠ index with zero percent foreign assets, and then adjust
from there. A first alternate portfolio has Ω≠ percent allocation to the S&P
∑≠≠ and ∞≠ percent to the MSCI EAFE; the next has ≤≠ percent invested in
the MSCI EAFE, and so forth until the last portfolio constructed has ∞≠≠
percent of its assets invested in the MSCI EAFE. For diversification into
emerging markets, we consider a U.S. investor investing in Latin markets
and measure returns and risk using the IFCI Latin America index.∞∂
Looking first at diversification into other developed markets, we examine
the argument as to whether benefits of diversification have declined as
argued in recent literature. Table ∫ shows that there is a clear trend of
increasing returns per unit of risk to U.S. investors investing in other devel-
oped economies during ∞Ωπ∏–∫Ω (Panel A). International investments pro-
vided better risk-adjusted returns at all levels of foreign investment, as in-
dicated by the monotonic increase in the Sharpe ratio. In practice, U.S.
investors invested a relatively small fraction of their portfolio in interna-
tional assets, but the trend of increasing returns per unit of risk is in line
with the arguments presented in early literature that international diversifi-
cation is beneficial.
The IFCI Latin America index was not available during this period, so no
conclusion can be reached for diversification into emerging markets. How-
ever, Panel B indicates why the more recent evidence suggests that the
benefits of international diversification are dropping for U.S. investors. Dur-
ing ∞ΩΩ≠–ΩΩ, the flat or declining Sharpe ratios for all levels of diversifica-
tion into both emerging markets and other developed countries implies
that U.S. markets provided the highest levels of risk-adjusted returns during
this period. Actual returns may have been higher in other markets, but they
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were accompanied by higher-than-proportionate levels of risk for which
investors were not adequately compensated.
In a mean-variance framework, the first panel of Figure ≤ shows the per-
formance of various portfolios during ∞ΩΩ≠–ΩΩ from the perspective of a
U.S. investor.∞∑ Beginning with a portfolio entirely invested in the S&P ∑≠≠,
the curve going from left to right tracks the risk and return of a combined
portfolio of the S&P ∑≠≠ and the IFCI Latin America index. Each subse-
quent point in the curve represents an increase of ∞≠ percentage points in
the share of the IFCI index in the portfolio. As the weight of the IFCI index
is increased, both the average return and the volatility of the portfolio rise.
The last data point, on the extreme right, is the risk and return of a portfolio
invested fully in Latin American equities; it is easy to see that the risk in-
creases proportionately much more than the return. From top to bottom,
the curve tracks the performance of a portfolio of the S&P ∑≠≠ and the
MSCI EAFE. This portfolio has quite different characteristics from the one
just discussed. As the weight of the MSCI EAFE rises in the portfolio (i.e.
going down the curve), both average return and volatility fall. The mini-
mum volatility portfolio is obtained at about ∂≠ percent of investment in
developed markets outside the U.S. However, as shown in Table ∫ above,
return per unit of risk is highest for the ∞≠≠ percent S&P ∑≠≠ portfolio, in
line with the performance of the U.S. equity markets over this period.
Similar analysis has been used by researchers to justify why diversification
into foreign securities offers limited benefits, from a U.S. investor’s perspec-
tive. Investment in emerging markets during the ∞ΩΩ≠s would have led to
only slightly higher returns than could be obtained at home, and at a very
high cost in terms of portfolio volatility. Meanwhile, investment in the more
developed markets of the world could have reduced volatility, but similar
risk reductions could have also been achieved via investment in the United
States domestic bond markets without necessarily having to invest abroad.∞∏
International Equity Investment: The Latin American
Perspective
We now turn the case of Latin American investors, so as to evaluate the
performance of equity portfolios of Latin investors as the share of foreign
assets held in their portfolio is increased. We focus on investors in five
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. These countries are
selected for two reasons. First, these are the only countries with reasonably
long time series of equity market data. Second, all have private pension
funds; in the next section, we shall explore the performance of the funds in
the first three countries.
We consider diversification by investors in these countries into U.S. mar-
kets (measured by the S&P ∑≠≠ index) and into developed markets outside
the U.S. (measured by the MSCI EAFE index). These are selected because
Figure ≤. Impact of international diversification on risk and return: equity average
return and risk. Source: Authors’ calculations using data provided by Standard &
Poor’s Emerging Market Database (≤≠≠≠) version, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Capi-
tal International, and pension fund regulators. Note: Investors in each country
begin by holding a portfolio consisting entirely of domestic assets and diversify into
two foreign portfolios as indicated. All returns and standard deviations are in the
domestic currency of the investor and calculated monthly and reported annually.
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investments in developed countries are likely to be of primary interest to
investors in emerging markets, especially when they are in the early stages of
international diversification. In addition, the U.S. has the largest single
equity market in the world, and hence it is a natural first choice for many
emerging market investors. Data are used for the longest time period for
which they are available: ∞Ωπ∏–ΩΩ for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, ∞Ωπ∏–ΩΩ for
Argentina, and ∞ΩΩ≥–ΩΩ for Peru. The analysis is undertaken in both a risk-
adjusted returns (Sharpe ratios) format and a mean-variance framework, as
in the case of the U.S. investor, above.
Table ∫ displays results for the risk-adjusted returns that could have been
obtained by investors in these countries. Similar to the U.S. case, two time
periods are considered: pre-∞ΩΩ≠, and ∞ΩΩ≠–ΩΩ. Portfolio returns and stan-
dard deviations are measured in the domestic currency of the respective
country. Panel A of Table ∫ indicates that during the pre-∞ΩΩ≠ period, inves-
tors in all countries (except Peru, where pre-∞ΩΩ≠ data were not available)
would have benefited in terms of higher risk-adjusted returns by diversifying
either into the S&P ∑≠≠ or the MSCI EAFE index. The Sharpe ratio for
portfolios containing international assets goes up for all countries. Argen-
tine and Brazilian investors would have obtained much higher returns per
unit of risk taken by investing their entire portfolios abroad. Brazilian inves-
tors obtained a return of ≠.∑∑ percent per year per unit of risk taken (stan-
dard deviation) by investing entirely in the portfolio of Brazilian equities
represented by the IFC Brazilian index. By investing half of their portfolio in
the S&P ∑≠≠ and the other half in Brazilian assets, they would have obtained
≠.∫ percent per annum per unit of risk taken. For Chilean and Mexican
investors, the Sharpe ratio increases up to some level of investment in for-
eign assets and then declines, indicating that while they would also have
benefited from international diversification, they should have held some
part of their portfolios in domestic equities. The evidence is broadly similar
for the ∞ΩΩ≠–ΩΩ period (Panel B of Table ∫), although the evidence is weak
for Argentine investors. During the ∞ΩΩ≠s, Peruvian investors would have
obtained higher returns per unit of risk by investing their entire portfolios
abroad.
The last five panels of Figure ≤ show the effect that international diversifi-
cation would have had for investors in the five countries during ∞ΩΩ≠–ΩΩ,
using a mean-variance framework.∞π The construction methodology of the
curves in the panels is the same as that described above. It is clear that for all
countries except Peru, the highest returns were available only in the domes-
tic equity markets, but these high returns came at the cost of high return
volatility. The latter could have been reduced by investing internationally.
Examining the fifth panel of Figure ≤, for example, we find that investors
holding their entire portfolio in Mexican equities during the period would
have obtained a return of about ≥≤ percent per year with a standard devia-
tion of returns of about ≤Ω percent. But by investing about ≥≠ percent of
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their assets in the S&P ∑≠≠ and holding the balance in domestic equities,
returns in local currency would have been about ≥∞ percent, with much
lower standard deviation of returns of about ≤∞ percent. In terms of returns
per unit of risk, therefore, investors would have benefited from interna-
tional diversification. Even more striking is the case of Peru, where over the
period ∞ΩΩ≥–ΩΩ, domestic investors would have obtained a ‘‘free lunch’’ by
investing in the S&P ∑≠≠ index with higher average return and lower stan-
dard deviation.
An important issue to be kept in mind here is that investors in emerging
markets face risk of devaluation of their home currency. In this context long
term foreign currency denominated assets can provide a natural hedge
against the risk of devaluation. While the breakdown of overall foreign asset
returns into those due to currency and those due to the performance of the
underlying assets is beyond the scope of this chapter, there is no doubt
that an analysis along these lines would yield greater insights into different
sources of portfolio risk and enable investors to develop appropriate man-
agement tools for these risks.
The International Investment Behavior of Latin American
Pension Funds
The financial evidence makes a case for international diversification of
equity portfolios by Latin American investors; next we ask how pension fund
returns in three Latin American countries would have changed had they
invested abroad. Similar to our previous analyses, we examine diversifica-
tion of pension funds into the U.S. equity market with returns measured by
the S&P ∑≠≠ index and other non-U.S. developed markets with returns
measured by the MSCI EAFE index.
We start with the realized mean and standard deviation of returns of
industry-wide pension fund portfolios in the three countries—Chile, Ar-
gentina, and Peru—since inception to year-end ∞ΩΩΩ. Srinivas and Yermo
(∞ΩΩΩ) show that for each of the three countries of interest, individual
pension fund portfolios and returns are not significantly different from the
industry-wide average and therefore the latter portfolio is representative of
individual pension fund portfolios. Monthly mean returns of industry-wide
pension fund portfolios for each country are obtained by weighting the
returns of each pension fund with the assets under its management. For
Chile, where the longest data series is available (∞Ω∫≤–ΩΩ), we break up the
series into pre-∞ΩΩ≠ and ∞ΩΩ≠–ΩΩ in order to examine differences in perfor-
mance across these time periods.
We then ask how these pension funds would have been affected under
alternate assumptions regarding investments in international equities. We
construct alternate hypothetical portfolios for pension funds by combining
their existing portfolios with different proportions of foreign investments,
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keeping the domestic asset allocation constant in proportional terms. This
construction assumes that pension funds had an ‘‘optimal’’ asset allocation
to domestic assets and therefore would make changes only at the margin if
international assets were made available to them. Therefore, the results
should be interpreted as those generated by a ‘‘marginal’’ change analysis.
This construction allows us to focus on the issue of impact of international
diversification as a risk management tool by pension funds, and to abstract
from conjectures regarding what domestic asset allocation pension funds
would have selected, if they also considered investing in international assets.
In practice, of course, allocations to both domestic and international assets
would be jointly determined using some form of an asset allocation model.
The patterns of returns per unit of risk under alternative assumptions
regarding foreign investment appear in Table Ω. One result is that during
Chile’s pension system’s early days (pre-∞ΩΩ≠), higher risk-adjusted returns
could not have been obtained by pension funds by investing abroad. The
Chilean plans obtained extremely high risk-adjusted returns in comparison
to all other markets (Table ∫). This tends to support the view that the
Chilean government worked to ensure that pension funds would obtain
high returns at a low level of risk. In order to achieve this, the government
provided the pension funds with access to government bonds that produced
high rates of return. Stringent asset-allocation restrictions ensured that gov-
ernment bonds were often the largest asset class in which pension funds
invested. This behavior on policymakers’ parts is sometimes justified on the
grounds that it is necessary to build the credibility of privatized social se-
curity systems. Over time, as the Chilean private pension system established
itself, returns on domestic government bonds fell, and the pension funds
were allowed to take on more risks and invest in a broader range of assets.
During this process, opportunities for risk management by investing abroad
increased. As a result, Chilean pensions would have obtained higher returns
per unit of risk by investing a portion of their assets abroad during ∞ΩΩ≠–ΩΩ,
as indicated by the increase in ratios for investment up to almost about ∂≠
percent of the portfolio in the S&P ∑≠≠ and ∞≠ percent for the EAFE index.
The impact of the S&P ∑≠≠ is much higher largely due to the stellar perfor-
mance of the US equity market in the ∞ΩΩ≠s.
Similar results hold for Argentina and Peru. We reiterate that this analysis
represents the impact of marginal changes rather than one where an asset
allocation model is used to arrive at an optimal portfolio. Hence we do not
suggest that any particular level of investment in foreign assets would be
justified using this analysis. We do, nevertheless, find strong indication that
pension fund risks could be better managed if the entire universe of invest-
ment opportunities were considered, including foreign assets.
Figure ≥ shows the impact of increasing levels of international equity hold-
ings on pension fund portfolios during the ∞ΩΩ≠s in a mean-variance frame-
work, using construction methodology similar to that described above. Here
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it is clear that pension funds in all countries took relatively low levels of risk.
It is particularly revealing to compare the location of the risk and return
point of the pension fund portfolios with the corresponding performance
of the domestic equity market (Figure ≤). Pension fund portfolios in all
countries achieved substantially lower levels of risk than the domestic equity
markets and proportionately higher levels of return. But Figure ≥ also shows
that Latin American pension funds would have benefited by investing inter-
nationally. Not surprisingly, the analysis shows that pension funds in all
three countries could have benefited by investing in the S&P ∑≠≠ during the
∞ΩΩ≠s. Peruvian pension funds would have benefited by investing in the
other developed markets also as measured by the MSCI EAFE, while non-
U.S. markets were not as attractive to Argentine and Chilean pension funds.
These results, together with earlier evidence, indicate that Latin pension
funds would gain from investing abroad in terms of higher returns per unit
of risk. Consequently, international investment would be a sound risk man-
agement strategy. Although these analyses focus on pension systems in Ar-
gentina, Chile, and Peru because of data limitations, it is likely that other
countries such as Bolivia, El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay would also have
large gains from diversification into developed markets. By not undertaking
such investments, these pension funds have implicitly imposed costs on
their stakeholders in terms of lost returns and higher risks.
Given these benefits, Latin pension funds would be expected to exploit
these benefits. But in Chile and Argentina, the two countries permitting
such investments during the second half of the ∞ΩΩ≠s, pension funds largely
shunned foreign markets until recently. Restrictions on foreign investment
regulations in both countries were not binding up to the end of ∞ΩΩΩ, as the
actual investments were far below the permitted levels. Why was this the
case?
One possible explanation for low levels of foreign investments could sim-
ply be a case of ‘‘home bias’’ for Latin American pension funds, a bias that
might gradually erode over time. Pension funds in some OECD countries
have been shown to have much lower levels of foreign investments than
would be optimal in a mean-variance framework, and home bias has been
Figure ≥. Impact of international investments on pension fund returns. Source:
Authors’ calculations using data provided by Standard & Poor’s Emerging Market
Database (≤≠≠≠) version), Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Capital International, and
pension fund regulators. Note: The figure shows the impact of international equity
investment on portfolio returns of pension funds in three Latin American countries.
Funds in each country begin by holding the same portfolio they actually did, indi-
cated by the point marked ‘‘Pension Fund.’’ Funds are then allowed to hold increas-
ing percentages of two foreign portfolios, indicated by the S&P and EAFE curves. All
returns and standard deviations are in domestic currency and calculated monthly
and reported annually.
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documented to be a major reason as to why pension funds prefer to stay at
home among developed countries (Davis, ∞ΩΩ∞; OECD ∞ΩΩ∫). Chilean pen-
sion funds do seem to be overcoming this home bias in recent years, as they
boost their international asset exposure. It is more difficult to explain the
lack of interest in international investments shown by Argentine pension
funds, given the large gains that could have been obtained during the late
∞ΩΩ≠s.
Home bias might be exacerbated in these countries by regulations that
constrain the ability of individual investors to choose pension funds that
offer them the most suitable combination of risk and return (Srinivas and
Yermo ∞ΩΩΩ). In the three Latin countries examined here, each pension
fund manager is required to offer only one fund.∞∫ Furthermore, returns to
the funds are subject to strict profitability rules.∞Ω As a result, pension asset
portfolios tend to be quite similar across pension funds and contributors are
constrained from selecting diversified portfolios. In particular, relative rate
of return rules may create inertia in investment management strategies and
make international diversification more costly for any given fund. Even if
some funds in the industry were to obtain significantly better returns by
investing abroad, they are still required to deposit part of the gains (the
return above the maximum of a band around the industry average) into a
‘‘reserve fund’’ that can be drawn down in case of future poor performance.
This implies that neither pension funds nor contributors benefit fully in the
short run from higher returns. And pension fund managers are imme-
diately penalized in the event of poor performance: they are required to
make up shortfalls either from the ‘‘reserve fund’’ or from its capital, if
performance is below the minimum of the band. Latin pension funds there-
fore have strong incentives to ‘‘follow the leader’’ and ensure that their
investments generate the industry average return. If one of the large pen-
sion funds does not invest abroad for any reason, it is very likely that the
industry equilibrium is one where the whole industry does not do so either.
Conclusion and Discussion
International diversification of investment portfolios has been recom-
mended for pension funds in developed country markets, and it has also
been shown here to benefit Latin American investors. Contributors to pen-
sion funds could have obtained higher risk adjusted returns had pension
funds invested abroad. When these benefits are not taken advantage of,
costs are imposed on pension fund stakeholders, be they workers, retirees,
or taxpayers. International diversification is especially important for coun-
tries with a limited supply of liquid domestic financial instruments, and for
those with unstable macroeconomic conditions. The presence of the latter
without the former may significantly reduce the attractiveness of domestic
pension fund returns.
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The lesson of this research for policymakers and pension fund managers
is that costs are imposed on contributors, in terms of higher risks per unit of
return, when foreign investments by national defined contribution pension
plans are restricted. Furthermore, those countries that currently do permit
international investment need to take a closer look at all features of their
regulatory framework to identify constraints imposed on the ability of pen-
sion fund managers to invest abroad and to explore ways to relax these
constraints. Prudential management of pension assets via diversification of
pension fund portfolios must take into account contributors’ interests in
bearing an optimal mix of risk and return.
Notes
The authors thank Robert Holzmann, Sudhir Krishnamurthi, David McCarthy,
Olivia Mitchell, Arun Muralidhar, and T. V. Somanathan for valuable comments.
Opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and not those of any institution
with which they may be affiliated.
∞. New funded pension systems were launched in several Latin American coun-
tries over the last two decades, including Chile (∞Ω∫∞), Peru (∞ΩΩ≥), Argentina
(∞ΩΩ∂), Colombia (∞ΩΩ∂), Uruguay (∞ΩΩ∑), Bolivia (∞ΩΩπ), Mexico (∞ΩΩ∫), and El
Salvador (∞ΩΩ∫). Some transition economies in Europe and Central Asia have also
reformed their pension systems along similar lines, including Hungary (∞ΩΩπ), Ka-
zakhstan (∞ΩΩπ), Poland (∞ΩΩΩ), Croatia (∞ΩΩΩ), and Latvia (≤≠≠≠).
≤. Feldstein (∞Ωπ∂) shows that privatization of social security would reduce distor-
tions that payroll taxes impose on household saving and labor supply decisions.
More recently, Feldstein (∞ΩΩ∫) has argued for investment of at least a portion of
social security taxes through individual accounts in the capital markets. Kotlikoff
(∞ΩΩ∏), among several others, supports Feldstein’s conclusions. However, Geana-
koplos et al. (∞ΩΩ∫ and ∞ΩΩΩ) show that the claim made by advocates of U.S. social
security privatization that rates of return under a defined contribution individual
account system would be much higher than under the current U.S. social security
system is inaccurate.
≥. See Markowitz (∞Ω∑Ω), Sharpe (∞Ω∏∂), Lessard (∞Ωπ≥, ∞Ωπ∂), Adler and Dumas
(∞Ωπ∑), Dumas (∞ΩΩ≥), Solnik (∞ΩΩ∞), and Claessens (∞ΩΩ∂) for discussions of vari-
ous aspects of portfolio theory and applications to international diversification.
∂. Agmon (∞Ωπ≤), Grubel (∞Ω∏∫), Grauer and Hakansson (∞Ω∫π), and Levy and
Sarnat (∞Ωπ≠), among others, find that international diversification is beneficial for
developed countries in terms of reducing portfolio risk and/or enhancing portfolio
return. This literature tends to rely mainly on a low measured correlation between
returns on international equity markets. Solnik (∞Ωπ∂) shows that the variance of
returns of a portfolio of randomly selected U.S. stocks is higher than that of a
portfolio of U.S. and international stocks.
∑. An example is the inability of financial models to anticipate the impact of events
such as the Mexican devaluation in ∞ΩΩ∂/Ω∑ or that of the East Asian crisis in
∞ΩΩπ/Ω∫.
∏. Personal communication with some large U.S. pension funds.
π. Discussions in the legislatures of El Salvador, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay along
these lines ensured that the privatized pension funds would not invest abroad. Chile
has since relaxed the rules, but international investments are still not allowed in the
other countries.
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∫. Investment in domestic stocks is another venue for diversification. However, this
may be difficult in several countries in the region due to the relatively small size of
equity markets and the large size of pension funds as compared to the market
capitalization. Stock and bond returns have also been shown to be highly correlated
in most emerging markets, reducing the gains from diversification.
Ω. A similar behavior has been observed among pension funds in Singapore (Holz-
mann, ≤≠≠≠b).
∞≠. In September ∞ΩΩΩ, Latin America as a whole formed just ≤∫.≤Ω percent of the
International Finance Corporation (IFC)’s Global Emerging Market Index. Individ-
ual country weights for the large countries were Argentina (≤.π∞ percent), Brazil
(∫.∞π percent), Chile (∂.π≠ percent), and Mexico (∞≠.∫∑ percent). In a global port-
folio including the developed countries, the weights of these countries would, of
course, be substantially lower. This implies that in order to hold a truly ‘‘world
portfolio,’’ much more than the allowed level of investments would have to be made
abroad by investors in these countries.
∞∞. Data on the S&P ∑≠≠ and MSCI EAFE were provided to the authors by Bloom-
berg and MSCI, for which we are grateful.
∞≤. To subtract administrative costs, we would need to develop a full actuarial and
economic model combining demographic and market return assumptions, an ex-
ercise beyond the scope of the present paper. For more on administrative cost esti-
mates see Mitchell (∞ΩΩΩ).
∞≥. It is clear that both the mean and variance of currency return play an impor-
tant role in international diversification. To the extent that hedging instruments are
available for currency risk management, it may be the case that investors would
benefit from hedging their currency exposure. In many emerging markets, includ-
ing those being examined here, long term hedging instruments either do not exist,
or they have come into existence very recently. Hence our focus on unhedged
returns is reasonable.
∞∂. Allowing the U.S. investor to diversify into a portfolio of all emerging market
stocks, as opposed to just Latin America, does not materially affect our results.
∞∑. Similar figures for earlier time periods are available from the authors.
∞∏. Analysis of this issue is not reported here but is available from the authors.
∞π. Figures for the earlier period are available from the authors.
∞∫. Chile introduced new legislation at the end of ∞ΩΩΩ that allows the establish-
ment of a new fund, invested exclusively in fixed income securities. In countries like
Mexico, Bolivia, and El Salvador, where pension assets are invested exclusively in
government bonds, an equivalent reform would be to introduce an internationally
diversified fund.
∞Ω. Similar regulations exist in other Latin American countries; only Mexico and
Bolivia do not impose rate of return regulations.
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